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Abstract 
This article examines the role of student demographic characteristics in 
standardized achievement test scores at both the individual level and aggregated at 
the state, district, school levels. For several data sets, the majority of the variance 
among states, districts, and schools was related to demographic characteristics. 
Where these background variables outside of the control of schools significantly 
affected averaged scores, and test scores result in high stakes consequences, 
benefits and sanctions may be inappropriately applied. Furthermore, disaggregating 
the data by race, SES, limited English, or other groupings ignores the significant 
confounding and cumulative effects of belonging to more than one disadvantaged 
group. With these approaches to evaluation being fundamental to the No Child 
Left Behind mandates, the danger of misinterpretation and inappropriate 
application of sanctions is substantial. 
Keywords: statistical methodology; accountability; student achievement; 
demographic factors. 
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Variables de antecedentes, niveles de agregación, y resultados en pruebas 
estandarizadas 
Resumen 
Este artículo examina el papel de las características demográficas de los estudiantes 
en los resultados de los pruebas estandarizadas tanto a nivel individual, como 
agregado a nivel de estado, distrito, y niveles escolares. Para varios conjuntos de 
datos, la mayoría de las variación entre los estados, distritos y las escuelas se 
relaciona con características demográficas. Cuando las variables de antecedentes, 
que están fuera del control de las escuelas, afectan de manera significativa el 
promedio de calificaciones y los resultados de las pruebas, premios y sanciones 
pueden ser utilizados de manera inadecuada. Además, desglosando los datos por 
raza, situación socioeconómica, limitaciones en el manejo del idioma inglés, u otras 
características importantes presenta el problema de ignorar los efectos 
acumulativos de pertenecer a más de un grupo desfavorecido. En estos métodos de 
evaluación que son fundamentales para la ley "No Child Left Behind”, los 
problemas y riesgos de malas interpretaciones y aplicación indebida de sanciones 
son muy importantes.  
Palabras clave: metodología estadística; responsabilidad; rendimiento de los 
estudiantes; factores demográficos. 
Introduction 
The celebration of success is important in every field, as is the inevitable identification of 
failure. In the field of education, the valued outcomes used to identify winners and losers have not 
always been well defined. Unlike business where the production of the most, best, and cheapest 
widgets may contribute to the bottom-line measure of success or profit, education has had no one-
size-fits-all bottom line number to identify winners and losers. For some students, success was 
receiving a diploma, for others it was entrance into college, and for others success might have been 
developing skills to benefit them in life and in the workplace. Failures were those who did not 
complete high school, who left the process without identifiable skills or knowledge that would serve 
to benefit them. 
Recently, however, the percentage of students passing their state’s standardized achievement 
test has become the universal indicator of success in education. It is the defining measure for 
winners and losers for individual students, for schools and districts, and even for states. To 
determine success and failure beyond the student level, scores are aggregated or averaged at different 
levels, and these aggregated scores often have very tangible consequences for teachers, schools, and 
districts. The practice of comparing averaged scores as an approach to evaluation is not new or 
unusual. The comparison of groups receiving an intervention or special program to other groups can 
provide insight into the effectiveness of the intervention. However, when the defining of success or 
more importantly failure carries serious consequences, special care must be taken to assure that the 
comparisons are valid or meaningful. The purpose of this study is to examine the validity of 
aggregating test scores at various levels of comparison: classroom, school, district, and state. In 
particular, does aggregation change the meaning of the scores, thereby rendering many of the 
associated high stakes decisions invalid? 
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Validity of Accountability Systems 
Although accountability systems have been used to evaluate the effectiveness of schools for 
decades, these systems vary widely from state to state and from district to district (Hamilton & 
Koretz, 2002; Linn, 2006a). The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB, 2002) created a 
dramatic movement towards standardizing accountability systems across the nation. Under NCLB, 
every state is required to develop a set of learning standards and a statewide test to assess whether or 
not students meet the standards. By 2014, every school must demonstrate that 100% of its students 
have reached proficiency on the standardized state test (where each state determines its own cutoff 
for proficiency). This system requires also that each school show adequate yearly progress (AYP) in 
meeting its goals, by demonstrating that there are improvements in the percentage of students 
meeting proficiency each academic year. Schools that fail to meet AYP two years in a row are 
deemed failures, and parents can move their children to a school that has met AYP. Inherent within 
the system are similar high-stakes consequences for students and for teachers. Students who do not 
reach proficiency may be held back or not allowed to graduate; teachers who do not show 
improvements in their students’ scores from year to year may receive no pay raise or be let go. These 
are indeed high-stakes tests. 
In the accountability system established by No Child Left Behind, annual standardized 
testing in every state has been heralded as the universal tool for accountability. However, to be 
effective, the system must be based on a number of assumptions: It assumes that the tests reflect 
important standards of learning that are being taught in the schools. It assumes that students who do 
not reach proficiency are inadequate in their knowledge and skills, regardless of their performance 
on other forms of assessment; and it assumes that these tests are better indicators of students’ ability 
than the judgments of the teachers. It assumes that the collective scores of teachers’ students reflect 
the quality of their instruction and it assumes that the collective scores of schools and districts 
reflect the quality of their educational programs. It even assumes that the collective scores of test-
takers from a state represent the quality of education and educational policies of the state. With little 
if any evidence that these assumptions are valid, policy makers have chosen to use these scores as 
the sole means of accountability for student, teacher, school, district, and even state-level 
performance. 
Even before the implementation of NCLB but especially in recent years, a number of 
researchers in education called into question such assumptions (e.g., Baker & Linn, 2002; Linn, 
2005, 2006a,b; Koretz, 2002; Meyer, 2000). They have questioned the validity of this system, based 
mainly on whether or not the test scores themselves are valid and on what scores aggregated at the 
classroom- (teacher) or school-level really mean. Validity is a concept used to indicate that a test or 
measure indeed assesses what it purports to test or measure. Although there has been much 
discussion about whether states’ standardized tests are valid assessments of their standards (Linn, 
1998; Miller & Linn, 2000), more debatable is whether the status of the percentage of students 
reaching proficiency on the test is a valid assessment of either a teacher’s or school’s educational 
performance (Kane, Staiger, & Geppert, 2002; Kirby, McCaffrey, Lockwood, McCombs, Naftel, & 
Barney, 2002; Le & Klein, 2002; Linn, 2006a, 2006b; Raudenbush, 2004) 
The inherent assumptions that the aggregate scores of students reflect their achievement in 
that classroom and in that school are wrong on a number of counts. First, no matter how valid the 
test may be in assessing a state’s learning standards, an individual score is also a reflection of only 
one type of learning (mostly concrete knowledge), using only one format (paper and pencil; usually 
multiple choice questions), in only one testing condition (timed, high pressure, anxiety producing). 
Further, scores may become inflated by practice effects, teaching to the test, and coaching (Kirby et 
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al., 2002; Koretz, 2002, 2005). Moreover, it has been argued that students’ individual scores include 
their initial cognitive skill, their history of achievement from previous years (and teachers), their 
family status, and the peer-orientation of the school (Hanushek, Kain, Markman & Rivkin, 2003; 
Linn, 2005; Meyer, 2000; Rouse, 2005). Consequently, aggregates of these individual scores are a 
reflection of achievement from many different sources, most of which are outside of the control of 
either the teacher or the school (Koretz, 2002; Linn, 2006a). When scores are aggregated, validity 
problems from the individual level become magnified (Kane & Staiger, 2002; Kane et al., 2002; 
Kirby et al., 2002). Therefore, in current status accountability systems, where classroom- and school-
level performance are based on aggregates of students’ scores at one point in time, the assessment of 
teachers’ and schools’ instructional and educational quality are not valid: the aggregate scores do not 
measure what the system purports they do (Hamilton, 2003; Linn, 2005, 2006a,b). 
More recently, accountability systems based on growth, or changes in scores from one year 
to the next, have been developed to overcome these validity issues. However, when AYP is 
calculated as the change in students’ aggregate scores from one year to the next, a new layer of 
validity problems are added. Similar to current status accountability systems, growth models also are 
based on a number of assumptions. Most egregious is that growth models are based on the inference 
that changes in students’ scores within a classroom or school are caused by the quality of instruction 
or education provided by teachers or schools; an assumption that is not valid on a number of counts 
(Hamilton, 2003; Koretz, 2005; Linn, 2006a,b). Comparing the percentage of students reaching 
proficiency on a state’s standardized achievement test from one year to the next to determine AYP 
is equivalent to a quasi-experimental research design that tests the effects of an intervention by 
comparing the scores of groups that have not been randomly assigned. Consequently, there are 
numerous threats to the validity of accountability systems based on growth (see Campbell & Stanley, 
1966; Cook & Campbell, 1979).  
The scores from one year to the next (one group to the next) may differ not because of any 
increased learning but for any number of the following reasons: testing – increased familiarity with a 
test (e.g., practice, practice, practice) can lead to improved performance not related to learning; 
instrumentation – changes in the measuring instrument (e.g., eighth grade test vs. ninth grade test, or 
changes in the criterion for proficiency) across testing times can yield changes in results not related 
to performance; statistical regression – on unreliable measures, high scorers tend to score lower and 
low scorers tend to score higher on subsequent testing (Kirby et al., 2002). In addition, the 
comparison of aggregate scores of successive cohorts from one year to the next is not a comparison 
of the same sample or even a matched sample [i.e., selection bias] (Linn, 2006a; Linn, Baker, & 
Betebenner, 2002). The students in a teacher’s classroom change from year to year and students 
within a school change from year to year (a function of both mobility [i.e., attrition] and new groups 
of younger students taking the place of the older students who have moved on).  
Finally, just as static scores may be inflated or confounded by selection factors (e.g., 
cognitive skill, race, SES) out of control of teachers and schools, change scores become inflated or 
confounded by selection even more. Although measuring change scores may control for some initial 
differences between students, these factors are still responsible for a large part of the growth (Kane 
& Staiger, 2002; Zvoch & Stevens, 2008). For example, more cognitively capable students may be 
primed for greater learning, and students from more advantaged homes may gain support from 
outside the school that is responsible for the learning. Therefore, to say that growth (or test-score 
change) is caused by educational practices in the school or classroom is invalid (Hamilton, 2003; 
Kane, 2006; Koretz, 2005; Linn, 2006a, 2006b; Raudenbush, 2004) from both a measurement and an 
experimental perspective. Although it is unclear whether those establishing or advocating current 
educational policy are aware of the inherent flaws in their approach to accountability, the threats to 
the validity of the evaluations cannot be ignored. 
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Yet another type of accountability system has been advocated as a means to overcome most 
or all of these threats to validity. Value-added models track individual student scores over time, and 
they have been touted as the most valid means for controlling for background characteristics of 
students (Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004; Sanders & Horn, 1998). Raudenbush (2004) agreed that 
value-added models are better than current status models, but he also pointed out that the 
confounding effects of student background factors could never be completely eliminated. 
Furthermore, selection biases can become magnified as these change scores begin to become 
confounded with classroom- or school-level changes (Kane & Staiger, 2002; Linn et al., 2002). These 
problems become even greater at the middle and secondary levels where students have multiple 
teachers and teachers’ class assignments change from year to year. Even the use of the most 
sophisticated statistical models cannot totally remove alternative explanations for learning, and it has 
been argued that value-added models should not be seen as causal models but as descriptive ones 
(e.g., Rubin, Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004). Additionally, many of the longitudinal changes in students, 
classrooms, and schools create violations of the assumptions of traditional hierarchical linear 
models, such that the “causes” of student learning can never be fully understood (McCaffrey, 
Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004). 
 One further attempt to overcome the influence of demographic traits on aggregated scores 
is to disaggregate scores, particularly at the school-level. Disaggregation is when (aggregated) scores 
are reported separately for different demographic groups, an approach mandated by the No Child 
Left Behind legislation. NCLB requires schools to report scores for seven subgroups: students with 
disabilities, limited English proficient, free/reduced lunch, African American, Asian/Pacific islander, 
Hispanic, and White (or alternative groups as defined by a state). The premise is that schools with 
students whose demographic or background characteristics may lower their aggregate scores can 
establish whether or not growth has occurred in each group separately. However, because schools 
must show AYP for each subgroup, schools who may have met AYP overall may fail if just one 
subgroup fails to reach the required level of proficiency. The more subgroups a school has, the more 
likely the school will fail to meet AYP (Baker & Linn, 2002; Linn, 2005). Furthermore, with many 
disadvantages for children being correlated, it is likely that many students will have multiple 
disadvantages and fall into more than one category. For example, a child of minority status likely will 
score lower on a standardized achievement test. If that same child is eligible for free lunches, the 
child might be expected to score even lower. If that poor minority student also has limited English 
proficiency or a disability, the child should be expected to score even lower. Disaggregation based 
on only one subgroup ignores the compounding effects of multiple disadvantages. So, if one school 
has ten percent minority students, and another school has fifty percent minorities, one would not 
necessarily expect the two schools’ disaggregated scores based on minority status to be different 
from each other, provided all of the students from both schools otherwise had the same 
characteristics. However, if that larger subgroup of minority students also had a larger percentage of 
students in multiple categories with multiple disadvantages, then that school will show lower scores 
for its minority students (perhaps not reaching AYP for that group) despite the same quality of 
education at the two schools. Therefore, the confounding effects of multiple demographic 
disadvantages make simple disaggregation both incomplete and potentially deceptive. 
Validity of Different Levels of Aggregation 
Despite validity problems when calculating AYP (aggregation at the school level) or when 
assessing teachers (aggregation at the classroom level), the common practice of aggregating measures 
to create averages or other indices for comparison and evaluation remains the cornerstone of the 
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education accountability movement. Many schools, districts, or even states do not have the 
resources or personnel needed to use the sophisticated statistical models of value-added 
accountability systems that may correct some but not all of the problems associated with assessing 
the quality of instruction or education. For these units, aggregate scores may be all they have to 
assess their own practices. Perhaps an even larger problem is the misuse of aggregated data to 
inform the public of the quality of their state’s education system. Local newspapers are quick to 
publish the average scores or proficiency percentages for area schools when achievement test data 
are released. Local television news highlights the meager gains and minor losses, and principals, 
superintendents, and state officials talk about the need to improve education and to raise standards. 
The general public uses these comparisons to make judgments about the quality of schools in their 
district and state. The public assumption that these scores are valid assessments of educational 
quality exacerbates the already weighty consequences of NCLB. And it is at the public level that the 
validity of different levels of aggregation becomes important. Is aggregation at the classroom level 
any more or less valid than aggregation at the school, district, or state levels? It has been suggested 
that higher levels of aggregation magnify the validity problems already inherent at lower levels (Kane 
et al., 2002; Kane & Staiger, 2002; Raudenbush, 2004). Although there is much theoretical evidence 
to question the validity of aggregated test scores, the empirical evidence that aggregated test scores 
are invalid assessments of educational quality at any level is limited.  
The studies that have been conducted have shown that the most prominent threat to the 
validity of group comparisons across all levels of aggregation (classroom, school, district and state) is 
selection. Because students are not randomly assigned to their groups (states, school districts, school 
buildings, or even classrooms), the demographic characteristics of groups of students have a major 
effect on aggregated scores at any level. Two studies highlight the effects of selection on aggregated 
scores; one using state aggregated SAT scores and one using state aggregated NAEP scores. For 
years, the College Board released the rank-order of state aggregated SAT scores to the public, who in 
turn interpreted the rankings to imply variation in states’ education quality. When its practice came 
under fire (Grissmer, 2000; Marchant & Paulson, 2001), the College Board acknowledged that the 
percentage of students taking the test from each state influences the averaged scores. The College 
Board now publishes the state data in rank-order based on the proportion of students who are test-
takers from each state; however, they fail to acknowledge that simply reporting the proportion 
taking tests masks how the demographic characteristics of the test takers might impact aggregated 
scores. Indeed, these test-taker characteristics (e.g., race, parent education, and family income) were 
found to account for as much as 94% of the variance in scores among states (Marchant & Paulson, 
2001). In a similar study using the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) data, 80% 
of the variation among states’ scores in reading and math were attributable to demographics, and 
changes in test scores from year to year were related significantly to changes in demographics 
(Marchant, Paulson, & Shunk, 2006). Therefore, to say that differences between group means are 
caused by differences in educational quality is invalid and inappropriate. The purpose of this study is 
to examine the role of selection in aggregated test scores at multiple levels; are the effects of 
selection apparent at every level of aggregation, thereby influencing the validity of the aggregate 
scores and the accountability judgments that can be made at different levels of aggregation? 
The Current Study 
The purpose of the current study is to examine the effects of aggregation (and 
disaggregation) at various levels. Two sources of data were used, because data for multiple levels of 
aggregation were not available from any one source. First, we used data from the 2001 SAT 
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database, because these data allowed for analysis of individual-, school-, and state-level data from a 
single source. Although the SAT assesses a slightly different aspect of learning (reasoning rather than 
achievement), not unlike state standardized tests, it too has high stakes consequences. At the 
individual level, students may or may not be admitted to certain colleges based on their scores. In 
turn, students’ aggregate scores at the high school level are seen as an indicator of schools’ 
educational quality, and at the college or university level as an indicator of the quality of admissions 
standards. Similarly, SAT scores aggregated at the state level are often viewed as an indication of the 
quality of a states’ education system. Furthermore, in previous work, it was shown that the effect of 
demographic characteristics on aggregated scores at the state-level were similar for both the SAT 
and the NAEP, despite differences in the tests’ purposes (Marchant & Paulson, 2001; Marchant et 
al., 2006). Moreover, when comparing state- or school-level aggregate scores, the SAT allows for 
comparison across states using the same test. Although state-standardized test data are available 
from each state’s department of education, each state uses a different test, making aggregate 
comparisons even less valid.  
Second, we used the data from the ISTEP+, the Indiana State Test of Educational Progress, 
for the assessment of both school- and district-level aggregation within a single state. We used the 
language arts and math test scores only, because those are areas comparable to those assessed by the 
SAT. Also similar to the SAT, the test is administered in a multiple-choice format. The ISTEP+ 
assesses both knowledge and critical thinking skills and has been found to be well aligned with the 
Indiana standards (Edwards, 2001). By examining school-level aggregation using two different data 
sources (the SAT and the Indiana state test), we could further support our use of the SAT for other 
levels of aggregation. Finally, we used state SAT data from two randomly chosen states, Louisiana 
and Delaware, in our assessment of the validity of disaggregation.  
In this study, we addressed two research questions. First, to what degree do demographic 
characteristics of test-takers influence aggregate test scores at different levels of aggregation 
(individual, school, district, and state); and second, is the practice of disaggregating scores for 
different demographic subgroups at the school level a valid means for controlling for demographic 
differences in score comparisons? 
Method 
Participants 
Participants for this study came from two databases. First, the College Board provided the 
database of all SAT test takers from 2001 (N = 1,219,550). From this database, SAT scores could be 
examined for individual students and aggregated by state (n = 51, including the District of 
Columbia) and by school (n = 14,432). The second database provided by the Indiana Department of 
Education contained state standardized test scores from 2001 aggregated for all 295 school districts 
and their schools in the state of Indiana.  
Measures 
SAT scores: State, school, and individual level data. The SAT is a reasoning test 
administered annually by the College Board to students who self-select to take the test. Nonetheless, 
the SAT is a high-stakes test in that it holds consequences for college admissions for those who take 
it. The voluntary nature of the test creates sampling issues unique to the test; however, SAT scores 
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aggregated by state behave similarly to other aggregated standardized achievement test scores in its 
relations to demographic characteristics of the test takers (i.e., the proportion of variance between 
states that can be attributed to demographics such as family income and parent education is similar; 
Marchant et al., 2006). Furthermore, state aggregated scores are more comparable across states with 
the SAT, than with individual state’s standardized test scores, because everyone is taking the same 
test. Similarly, data could be aggregated at the school level and comparisons of schools in different 
states are based on the same test. Moreover, individual level data were available from this dataset. 
For the purposes of this study, students’ total scores on both the math and verbal portion of 
the test were used. Individual SAT scores range from 400–1600; in this sample, 464 students 
achieved a perfect score of 1600 and 330 students achieved the lowest score of 400.  
ISTEP scores: District and school level data. The Indiana Standardized Test of Educational 
Progress (ISTEP+) is the standardized achievement test given to students in grades three through 
ten in all school districts in Indiana. The test was developed as an assessment of the Indiana State 
Standards of Learning in accordance with No Child Left Behind. For the purposes of this study, 
data on both the math and language arts portions of the test were used, reported as the percentage 
of students who reached proficiency on both portions, aggregated by district and by high school. We 
used percentage of students reaching proficiency, because that is the standard by which AYP under 
NCLB is determined. The average pass rate across the state is about 60%.  
Demographic data. Demographic characteristics of the test takers that have been found to be 
confounded with aggregated test scores were included. Academic skills of students were measured 
from the SAT data using students’ high school grade point average and their high school class rank, 
assessed as the percentage of test-takers who ranked academically in the top ten percent of their 
class. From the ISTEP+, we used the Cognitive Skill’s Index (an assessment similar to an 
intelligence score thought to reflect non-subject specific ability) and the percentage of special 
education students. The SAT provided the family demographics of income, assessed as the 
percentage of families with income over $80,000, and parent education level, assessed as the 
percentage of parents with a bachelors degree or higher. The ISTEP+ provided the percent of 
students eligible for free lunch. Finally, race was assessed using the percent of African American 
students for both the SAT and the ISTEP+. In addition, in state-level analyses with the SAT, the 
percent of students taking the test from each state was included to provide a moderate control for 
the selection bias inherent in the test. 
Results 
State-Level Data 
Multiple regression analyses were used to assess the proportion of variance in scores 
aggregated at the state-level that could be attributed to the demographic characteristics of the test-
takers. Using the SAT data aggregated by state, regression showed that the percentage of test-takers 
from each state, high school grade point average, high school rank, family income, and parent 
education level predicted a large proportion of the variance in SAT scores among states, R2 = .91, 
F(5,45) = 88.99, p < .001). In a second regression analysis, the addition of the race factor boosted 
the proportion of variance predicted, R2 = .94, F(6, 44) = 115.62, p < .001. The contributions of 
each demographic factor are shown in Table 1. 
In a follow-up analysis, all of the variables that did not account for a unique proportion of 
variance were removed from the regression equation, leaving parent education level and race. In this 
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regression, these two variables accounted for 90 percent of the variance in aggregated SAT scores 
among states, R2 = .90, F(2, 48) = 89.00, p < .001. Both parent education level (standardized  
β = 0.85, t = 18.45, p < .001) and race (β = - 0.32, t = - 6.92, p < .001) accounted for significant 
proportions of unique variance. 
 
Table 1 
Regression analysis of demographics predicting state-aggregated SAT scores 
Variable B SE β t p 
(Constant) 738.32 144.86  5.10 .001 
Percent taking SAT -0.17 0.32 -0.07 -0.54 .589 
High school GPA 49.69 43.37 0.16 1.15 .258 
High school rank 1.18 1.05 0.18 1.12 .267 
Family income 1.19 0.60 0.16 1.98 .054 
Parent education 2.80 0.84 0.41 3.32 .002 
Race -1.37 0.28 -0.21 -4.87 .001 
R2 = .94, df = 6, 44, F = 115.62, p < .001 
District-Level Data 
Multiple regression analyses were used to assess the proportion of variance in percentage of 
students reaching proficiency on the ISTEP+ aggregated at the district-level that could be attributed 
to the demographic characteristics of the test-takers. Four variables were entered into a regression 
equation: the average Cognitive Skills Index for 2001–2002, percentage of special education 
students, percentage of minority students (race), and percentage of students eligible for free lunch 
(family income). These factors predicted 70% of the differences among school districts (R2 = .70, 
F[4, 256] = 146.65, p < .001) with the Cognitive Skills Index, percentage of special education 
student, and family income accounting for significant proportions of unique variance (see Table 2). 
Removal of the Cognitive Skills Index from the equation reduced the R2 to .51 (p < .001).  
 
Table 2 
Regression analysis of demographics predicting district-aggregated ISTEP+ proficiency 
Variable B SE β t p 
(Constant) -74.14 12.48   -5.94 .001  
Cognitive Skills Index 1.38 0.12 0.53 12.00 .001  
Special Education -0.43 0.11 -0.15 -4.01 .001  
Family income -0.27 0.05 -0.29 -5.58 .001  
Race -0.06 0.03 -0.08 -1.85 .065  
R2 = .70, df = 4, 256, F = 146.65, p < .001 
 
In an effort to make the district-level analyses using the ISTEP+ more equivalent to those 
with the SAT data, only high school ISTEP+ data (tenth grade) were retained in the final analysis for 
districts. In this multiple regression, demographic factors predicted 77% of the variability in district-
level pass rates for high school students (R2 = .77, p < .001), with Cognitive Skills and income both 
predicting unique proportions of variance. The total predicted proportion of variance dropped to 
68% when the Cognitive Skills Index was removed from the equation and both race (β = -0.17,  
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t = -3.43, p < .01) and income (β = -0.70, t = -14.21, p < .001) predicted significant portions of 
unique variance. 
School-Level Data 
Using the SAT database again, with data aggregated at the school level, multiple regression 
analyses were used to assess the proportion of variance in scores that could be attributed to the 
demographic characteristics of the test-takers. At the school level, 63% of the variance among 
14,432 high schools in the United States was predicted with grade point average, high school rank, 
parent education and income, and race (R2 = .63, F[5, 14426]= 4968.28, p < .001) with all of the 
variables predicting unique portions of the variance (see Table 3). In a follow-up analysis using only 
parent education and race (in keeping with the final analysis run with the state-level data), 51% of 
the variance in school-aggregated scores continued to be predicted, R2 = .51, F(2, 14429) = 7651.88, 
p < .001. Both parent education level (β = 0.53, t = 88.95, p < .001) and race (β = - 0.37, t = - 
62.64, p < .001) accounted for significant proportions of unique variance. 
 
Table 3 
Regression analysis of demographics predicting school-aggregated SAT scores 
Variable B SE β t p 
(Constant) 493.04 8.54   57.75 .001  
High school GPA 130.85 2.71 0.33 48.28 .001  
High school rank 19.59 4.03 0.03 4.86 .001  
Family income 115.05 3.94 0.21 29.20 .001  
Parent education 205.38 4.23 0.34 48.60 .001  
Race -144.88 3.39 -0.24 -42.75 .001  
R2 = .63, df = 5, 14426, F = 4968.28, p < .001 
 
In addition, SAT scores aggregated at the high school level were examined for schools in 
Indiana only. A multiple regression found that the same variables accounted for 60% of the 
variation in school-aggregated SAT scores in Indiana (R2 = .60, F[5, 400] = 121.82, p < .001), with 
all of the demographic factors predicting unique proportions of the variance among schools (see 
Table 4). Even after removing all of the factors except parent education and race from the equation, 
53% of the variance continued to be predicted (p < .001). 
 
Table 4 
Regression analysis of demographics predicting school-aggregated SAT scores for Indiana 
Variable B SE β t p 
(Constant) 666.01 39.20   16.99 .001  
High school GPA 89.53 13.18 0.27 6.79 .001  
High school rank 54.34 24.24 0.08 2.24 .025  
Family income 104.31 23.72 0.22 4.40 .001  
Parent education 172.47 25.10 0.34 6.87 .001  
Race -141.68 15.68 -0.32 -9.04 .001  
R2 = .60, df = 5, 400, F = 121.82, p < .001 
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Finally, school-level aggregation was examined using the ISTEP+ data from Indiana high 
schools. These data provided two parallels: we were able to examine high school-level data using two 
different tests (SAT and ISTEP+) and we were able to compare both school- and district-level data 
using the same test (ISTEP+). The multiple regression showed that the demographic variables of 
Cognitive Skills Index, race, and family income significantly predicted 65% of the variance in school 
aggregated state achievement, R2 = .65, F(3, 246) = 58.69, p < .001 (see Table 5). With Cognitive 
Skills Index removed from the equation, 56% of the variance in the percent passing the ISTEP+ at 
the high school level was accounted for by family income and race. 
 
Table 5 
Regression analysis of demographics predicting school-aggregated ISTEP+ proficiency 
Variable B SE β t p 
(Constant) -54.66 21.65   -2.43 .017  
Cognitive Skills Index 1.13 0.20 0.47 5.78 .001  
Family income -0.49 0.12 -0.40 -4.01 .001  
Race -0.06 0.03 -0.08 -0.47 .639  
R2 = .65, df = 3, 246, F = 58.69, p < .001    
Individual-Level Data 
At the individual student level, high school grade point average, high school rank, family 
income and parent education, and race were significant predictors of SAT scores (R2 = .41,  
p < .001). In a second regression with only parent education and race, the amount of variance 
predicted dropped to 16%.  
Comparisons of Top- and Bottom-Performing  
States, Districts, Schools, and Individuals 
To further demonstrate the role of demographics in predicted variability at all levels, we 
compared the means for each of the demographic factors for top and bottom performing units 
(states, districts, schools) at each level. At the state level, we compared the contribution of each 
demographic factor for the top ten and the bottom ten SAT-scoring states (see Table 6). The top ten 
scoring states had students with significantly higher GPA, class rank, parent education and parent 
income and significantly fewer African American students than did the bottom ten states.  
Demographic differences between high and low performing school districts were highlighted 
further by comparing the characteristics of the ten Indiana school districts with the highest ISTEP+ 
scores to the ten school districts with the lowest scores (see Table 7). To highlight the school-level 
differences in demographics, the characteristics of the 15 highest scoring schools and the 15 lowest 
scoring schools on the SAT were compared (see Table 6). As with states, students from the highest 
scoring schools had significantly higher GPA, class rank, parent income, and parent education, and 
significantly fewer African Americans. Similar comparisons for both the SAT (Table 6) and the 
ISTEP+ (Table 7) were made for the top 15 and bottom 15 scoring schools in Indiana.  
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Table 6 
Means, standard deviations of demographic predictors of SAT scores: State, school, individual  
Unit of analysis and  
set of interest SAT total GPA 
Class 
rank 
Parent 
educ 
Family 
income Race 
States in United States  
(R2 = .94, n = 51) 1,066 (67) 3.41 (0.22) 31 (10) 37 (10) 31 (09) 10 (10) 
Top 10 states 1,165 (20) 3.63 (0.09) 42 (05) 50 (03) 43 (07) 5 (04) 
Bottom 10 states 989 (14) 3.22 (0.13) 21 (02) 28 (04) 24 (02) 20 (17) 
High schools, nation  
(R2 = .63; N = 14,432) 1,018 (124) 3.38 (0.31) 33 (20) 30 (21) 26 (22) 11 (21) 
Top 15 high schools 1,407 (20) 3.51 (0.25) 43 (19) 74 (14) 64 (18) 8 (07) 
Bottom 15 high schools 628 (33) 2.92 (0.28) 24 (19) 8 (10) 2 (04) 54 (33) 
Indiana high schools  
(R2 = .60; n =406) 987 (67) 3.16 (0.20) 24 (10) 22 (13) 20 (14) 5 (15) 
Top 15 high schools 1,148 (58) 3.36 (0.16) 29 (15) 49 (20) 39 (23) 5 (08) 
Bottom 15 high schools 791 (48) 2.76 (0.24) 22 (12) 12 (11) 6 (09) 62 (39) 
Individuals  
(R2 = .41; N = 1,219,550) 1,018 (207) 3.28 (0.65) 23 (42) 31 (46) 28 (45) 12 (32) 
Perfect score (n = 464) 1,600 (0) 4.09 (0.27) 93 (26) 83 (38) 66 (47) 0 (00) 
Lowest score (n = 330) 400 (0) 2.66 (0.65) 5 (22) 9 (29) 2 (15) 51 (50) 
Class rank = percentage of test-taking students ranking in top decile of class; parent education = 
percentage of parents with bachelors degree or higher; family income = percentage with income above 
$80,000;  
race = percentage African American 
 
Table 7 
Means, standard deviations of demographic predictors of ISTEP+ scores: District, school 
Unit of analysis and  
set of interest 
ISTEP+ 
Pass % 
Cognitive 
Skills 
Family 
Income Race 
Districts in Indiana 
(R2 = .70, n = 261) 61 (12) 106 (05) 12 (09) 5 (11) 
Top 10 states 87 (05) 114 (04) 3 (01) 3 (03) 
Bottom 10 states 31 (04) 95 (03) 39 (13) 34 (25) 
High schools in Indiana 
(R2 = .65; N = 406) 59 (16) 106 (05) 14 (12) 10 (20) 
Top 15 high schools 89 (05) 114 (03) 2 (02) 3 (03) 
Bottom 15 high schools 10 (08) 93 (05) 45 (25) 36 (29) 
Family income = percentage with free lunch; race = percentage African American 
 
Finally, at the individual level, demographic characteristics of those test-takers receiving the 
highest possible score on the SAT (1600) and those test-takers receiving the lowest possible score on 
the SAT (400) were compared (see Table 6). Differences between the proportions of variance 
explained at the state and individual level were remarkable. Figure 1 emphasizes the extreme role of 
demographics in predicting higher-level aggregated scores. 
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Figure 1a. Predicted variance distribution by factors among individual SAT scores. 
 
 
Figure 1b. Predicted variance distribution by factors among state aggregated (mean) SAT scores. 
Disaggregation  
One problem with disaggregation is that it ignores the confounding and cumulative effects 
that occur when students belong to more than one disaggregation category. This problem can be 
seen best by looking at the cumulative percentages of students across all demographic categories that 
are known to be related to lower SAT scores for each state (see Figure 2): percentage African 
American, percentage from families with incomes less than $80,000, percentage with parents without 
a college education, percent from the bottom 90 percent of their high school class, and lower GPAs. 
Note that cumulative percentages are greater than 100 percent in all states, given that most students 
fall into more than one disadvantaged category. As would be expected, the states with the lower 
SAT scores have a higher combination of disadvantages. Although it is possible that disadvantaged 
Unmeasured
Parent Education
Family Income
African American
High School GPA
Class Rank
Unmeasured
Parent Education
African American
HS Success
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test-takers in the lower scoring states are each falling into only one discrete category, it is more likely 
that they are falling into multiple categories. In fact, the variable created by the combination of test-
disadvantaged characteristics was more highly related to SAT scores (r = .89, p < .001) than any 
single characteristic.  
 
 
Figure 2. Total percentage of students in all demographic categories by state ranked from lowest 
to highest aggregated mean SAT scores.  
 
Statistically, disaggregation assumes that each disadvantaged category of students has a main 
effect on achievement outcomes. Although this may indeed be true, examining only main effects 
ignores interactions between categories. Using the SAT data, an analysis of variance that examined 
the effects of family income and race on SAT scores yielded significant differences on both factors 
(see Table 8). However, the interaction also was significant, showing that students who belong to 
both disadvantaged categories have significantly lower scores than either individual category.  
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Table 8 
Interaction of race and family income in predicting SAT scores: mean and standard deviations 
 Lower income High income Total 
African American 843.50 (175.27) 964.99 (190.69) 855.79 (180.64) 
Not African American 1,003.47 (192.14) 1,111.57 (187.11) 1,037.04 (197.05) 
Total 980.01 (198.02) 1,105.53 (189.51) 1,015.93 (203.68) 
Note . ANOVA showed main effects and interaction of income and race on SAT scores to be significant, 
p < .001. 
 
The problem of students belonging to multiple categories is demonstrated further by 
comparing SAT scores from individual states. Here, we focus on SAT scores from Delaware and 
Louisiana disaggregated for African American test-takers (about 18% of the test-takers from both 
Delaware and Louisiana were African American). Louisiana’s mean SAT score was 126 points higher 
than for Delaware and 140 points higher for African American test-takers. These results were not 
surprising considering that Delaware had half as many of their African American test-takers from 
the top decile of their high school class as Louisiana, and Delaware’s African American test-takers 
had lower GPAs. Louisiana had a greater percentage of their African American test-takers from 
families with incomes over $80,000 and a larger proportion of their test-takers’ parents had college 
degrees. To say that Louisiana is preparing its African American test takers better than Delaware 
would be invalid, because their membership in advantaged income and education groups has been 
ignored in such an assumption.  
Discussion 
Numbers are seductive. Numbers put concrete values on abstract things. Numbers create 
meaning when none is apparent. It is not surprising that when the post-Sputnik United States 
experienced beliefs of educational inferiority, numbers showed up offering a deceptively simple 
answer to a vague and complex problem. Paired with new approaches to education in general and 
instruction in particular, ideas of measuring outcomes, rewarding the good, and apparently more 
importantly, punishing the bad found their way into our schools. Over time, this simple behavioral 
approach thought to improve achievement found its way into federal law. The current system of 
assessing outcomes as a means of holding schools accountable for their performance, established by 
NCLB, has become the educational intervention itself. The instruments for assessing change have 
become the instruments for producing change. Inherent within NCLB is the belief that testing will 
produce improved achievement, which in turn is measured by the tests. Inherent as well are the 
beliefs that teachers’ instructional practices and schools’ educational policies are the causes of the 
improved achievement; it is assumed that test scores are valid assessments of teaching and learning. 
Contrary to these assumptions, this is what we know: The meaning of aggregated test scores 
changes at different levels of aggregation because the factors that are inherent within individual 
scores interact when they are summarized at an aggregate level. Individual students’ scores have 
prior academic skills and family background imbedded in them. As much as 41% of the variation 
among students can be accounted for by innate and contextual factors that students bring with them 
when they come to school. When these data are summarized at increasingly higher levels of 
aggregation, these background differences account for greater proportions of variance. From a 
statistical perspective, this would be expected. What this means in practice, however, is that the 
meaning of the scores has changed and the conclusions that can be drawn from the scores has 
changed. Unfortunately, aggregated scores are being used at every level of aggregation to draw 
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similar conclusions about quality of instruction and education. Arguments concerning the meaning 
(i.e., the validity) of individual test scores were posed even before the establishment of NCLB, yet 
they are still used to make high stakes decisions for teachers, schools, and districts.  
The results of this study showed that the variance among states’ test scores could be 
predicted by knowing the demographic characteristics of the students within each state. As much as 
94% of the state variation in SAT scores can be explained by students’ academic standing, parent 
income and education, and race. In fact, 90% of the variance can be predicted with parent education 
and race. To assume that differences in states’ SAT scores are an indication of differences in their 
educational quality is not valid, based almost solely on selection bias. Using states’ standardized test 
scores developed under NCLB would be even more invalid on the basis of differences in 
instrumentation among states (each state’s test is different). However, it has not historically been 
unusual to see the media make inferences about the quality of states’ education systems based on 
their test scores. Similarly, state lawmakers use such comparisons to either praise or admonish their 
state’s ability to educate its children. 
Similarly, a major portion of the differences among schools and school districts is also a 
function of student demographic characteristics that are not under the control of schools or 
teachers. In Indiana, as much as 70% of the variance among school districts and 65% of the variance 
among individual schools on the state standardized achievement test (ISTEP+) can be predicted by 
students’ inherent academic skills, family income, and race. Similarly, 63% of the variance in schools’ 
SAT scores among high school nationwide (and 60% in Indiana alone) can be explained by students’ 
academic skills, parent income and education, and race. To use these scores to pass judgment about 
a school or district’s quality of education is simply not valid. And to use these scores to infer 
differences in the educational quality of schools or districts is unethical. To assume that these test 
scores are valid indicators of teachers’ instructional skills or schools’ educational policies is not 
justifiable on either theoretical or empirical/experimental grounds. 
Perhaps knowing the proportion of variance in test scores contributed by demographic 
characteristics would provide for better judgments or comparisons within accountability systems. 
For example, in a hypothetical school, Teacher A has 20 students: 10 are African American, 5 are 
disabled, and 5 are from low SES families. Her aggregated test scores show that 60% of her students 
reached proficiency. In another school, teacher B has 20 students: all 20 are White, no students are 
disabled, and all students are from middle/upper income families. Her aggregated test scores show 
that 75% of her students reached proficiency. Under current accountability systems, Teacher B 
would be deemed a better teacher; and her school would meet AYP, because all of its students have 
similar demographic traits. However, by controlling for the known contribution of certain 
demographic characteristics to average test scores at varying levels of aggregation, expected 
aggregated test scores could be computed. In this example (using state-wide data from Wisconsin), 
we found that Teacher A had more students reach proficiency than would be expected based on their 
demographics; whereas Teacher B had fewer students reach proficiency than would be expected. In 
a recent study, a comparison of the “best” and “worst” schools in Indiana based on aggregated 
scores showed that when expected scores were computed by controlling for demographics, several 
of the “top” schools performed well below expectations and several of the “bottom” schools 
performed well above expectations (Marchant, Grizzle, Morales Ordonez, & Paulson, 2008). The 
current judgments being made under NCLB using static accountability systems are not valid. 
Despite the development of accountability systems (e.g., growth models and value-added 
models) to control for factors that are beyond the control of teachers and schools, the influence of 
students’ inherent cognitive skills and students’ family background on their school performance 
cannot be eliminated completely. In addition, value-added systems tend to be costly and may be 
difficult for even the most technically sophisticated school districts to implement without 
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consultants. Moreover, they are most useful at the lowest levels of aggregation (student or 
classroom) and will do little to eliminate invalid comparisons that continue to be made at school, 
district, and even state levels.  
Perhaps even more troubling is that information about the demographic factors that are 
known to explain the greatest proportion of variance in scores has become increasingly more 
difficult to get. Educational policies are moving away from making that information available. For 
example, Indiana no longer requires the Cognitive Skills component of the state achievement test, 
despite our knowing that one of the most important variables included in value-added assessments 
during the elementary years is the cognitive ability of the students (Raudenbush, 2004). Similar 
movements have been seen at the national level. In September of 2003, the board that was 
established as a result of No Child Left Behind and that now oversees the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) decided to sharply curtail the survey data that is collected with the 
tests (Schemo, 2003). The board stated that the surveys were too intrusive and burdensome and had 
little to do with the mission of providing a snapshot of achievement. 
Another means of overcoming arguments regarding the influence of demographic factors on 
aggregated test scores is to disaggregate scores for individual groups of students based on family 
income, race, or special education designations. However, while these data provide information 
about the main effects of a single demographic trait, they ignore the additive and interactive effects 
that multiple factors working in concert have on scores. Although identifying categories of students 
in need of assistance may be helpful, variations in highly correlated factors that influence 
achievement (e.g., race and income) render simple comparisons inappropriate. 
There is increasing evidence that, as part of a punitive accountability system, numbers are 
taking a toll on the qualities previously valued in our education system. The case against high-stakes 
testing on the basis of what it does to the nature of instruction, the impact on children, and the cost 
resulting in the depletion of other educational resources is fairly well established (Marchant, 2004). 
The unfortunate negative consequences associated with the use of aggregated scores that drive this 
accountability system are even less tolerable given the knowledge that these numbers are not valid 
representations of educational quality. The potential negative effect of using simple numbers in 
educational decision-making should come as no surprise, a warning is found in a well established 
principle of social science known as Campbell’s law (Campbell, 1975 as cited in Nichols & Berliner, 
2005, p. 4): “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision making, the more 
subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the social 
processes it is intended to monitor.” Thirty years later, similar arguments concerning the validity of 
using single numbers as the basis for educational accountability continue to be made. 
High-stakes decisions based on school-mean proficiency are scientifically 
indefensible. We cannot regard differences in school mean proficiency as 
reflecting differences in school effectiveness…To reward schools for high mean 
achievement is tantamount to rewarding those schools for serving students who 
were doing well prior to school entry…The unjustifiable use of school-mean 
proficiency for high-stakes decisions will disparately affect schools serving poor 
children. (Raudenbush, 2004, p. 35) 
In the face of inescapable validity concerns, continued use of aggregated and disaggregated 
scores to assess educational quality begs the question: Are those advocating the current 
educational accountability policy unaware of these issues, or purposefully ignoring them? Given 
the information available to them, educational policy makers cannot claim ignorance anymore 
and schools cannot ignore the potential evil inherent within the policies that govern them. The 
use of invalid accountability systems to make high-stakes decisions must stop; our children’s 
education and our nation’s future depend on it. 
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